Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity by Joseph P. Lorenz

Author:Joseph P. Lorenz [Lorenz, Joseph P.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, General, Middle East
ISBN: 9780813375939
Google: -2ptAAAAMAAJ
Goodreads: 1171168
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1990-06-03T00:00:00+00:00

The Arab Response to Jerusalem

It is an interesting question whether Sadat was driven to emphasize Egyptian nationalism by Arab censure or whether, as some argue,22 he deliberately sought to stir up Egyptian chauvinism and polarize the Arab world in order to pave the way for a separate agreement with Israel. The answer lies in the unfolding Egypt-Arab relationship after Jerusalem—the challenges and responses that led to new directions for Egypt and, ten months later, to the Camp David accords.

As soon as he returned from Jerusalem, Sadat briefed Prince Fahd about his trip and its purposes. It was too late: The Saudis had been sorely offended by his failure to bring them into his thinking before the visit. Moreover, they believed that the slight had been deliberate; for although Sadat had visited the kingdom just a few days before he told the Peoples’ Assembly of his readiness to go to Jerusalem, he had said nothing in Riyadh about his plans. It was not that he had not thought about doing so. On the way to Riyadh, Fahmy urged him to consult with the Saudi leadership. He dismissed the idea, however, saying that “they are not of the standard or caliber to digest or understand such moves.”23

In fact Sadat’s main reason for leaving out the Saudis was probably a sense that, if told beforehand, they would feel bound to speak out against the initiative to protect their Arab flanks. He may even have concluded that they would prefer not to be consulted. National pride also doubtless played a part: A move of such importance was not something about which an Egyptian leader consulted with other Arabs. As it turned out, the Saudis were annoyed not only because they had not been consulted but also because the initiative coincided with the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca. To the pious, gathered at Islam’s holiest site, Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was a bitter reminder of Israel’s occupation of the other city sacred to their religion and an act that seemed to recognize implicitly that occupation. As one Saudi official put it, “Moslems from all over the world were coming to the holy places and there was Sadat going to the Knesset.”24

The only serious discussion about his Jerusalem initiative that Sadat had with another Arab leader took place with Assad three days before the visit. Despite their deep-seated personal and policy differences, Sadat spent four hours in Damascus explaining to Assad the purposes of his initiative. Neither man changed his views, but Sadat’s effort to explain his objectives argues against any intention to goad the militant Arabs into a confrontation.

On November 17 Syria declared a national day of mourning. Thus began a Syrian drive to isolate Egypt and capture the leadership of the confrontation states that dominated Arab politics during the next four years and survived Sadat’s death. Syria’s swing from strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan to energizer of the rejectionist block was as momentous as it was sudden. With Syria’s defection, the militant Arab states and the radical Palestinian groups acquired new weight and credibility.

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